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The issue of formalizing skepticism relations between argumentation semantics has been
considered only recently in the literature. In this paper we provide a twofold contribution
to this kind of analysis. First, starting from the traditional concepts of skeptical and cred-
ulous acceptance, we introduce a comprehensive set of seven skepticism relations, which
provide a formal counterpart to several alternative notions of skepticism at an intuitive
level. Then we carry out a systematic comparison of a signiﬁcant set of literature semantics
(namely grounded, complete, preferred, stable, semi-stable, ideal, prudent and CF2 seman-
tics) on the basis of the proposed skepticism relations.
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The increasing variety of argumentation semantics proposed in the literature raises the issue of carrying out systematic
principle-based comparisons between different approaches. While limitations of example-based comparisons have been
pointed out earlier by several authors (see for instance [1,2]), studies on general evaluation principles for argumentation
semantics are appearing in the literature only in very recent years. For instance, in [3] general rationality postulates for argu-
mentation systems are introduced, showing that there are argumentation systems where they are violated. At the more ab-
stract level of Dung’s argumentation frameworks [4], several semantics evaluation criteria have been introduced and
exploited in [5] for a systematic assessment of both ‘‘traditional” and more recent proposals.
In this work we consider another aspect of this kind of systematic comparison, namely the issue of (partially) ordering
argumentation semantics with respect to their skepticism. At a general level, skepticism is related with making more or less
committed evaluations about the justiﬁcation state of arguments in a given situation: a more skeptical attitude corresponds
to less committed (i.e. more cautious) evaluations. Differences in skepticism may affect the suitability of alternative argu-
mentation semantics with respect to different application contexts, where a more or less cautious attitude is appropriate.
While this issue has been dealt with in the literature mostly at an informal or semiformal level [6,4], we provide here a sys-
tematic approach to the deﬁnition of skepticism relations and to the relevant comparison among argumentation semantics.
The paper is organized as follows. After recalling the necessary background concepts in Section 2, in Section 3 we intro-
duce a set of skepticism relations and discuss their relationships and properties. Argumentation semantics considered in this
paper are reviewed in Section 4, then Section 5 shows how they are partially ordered according to the proposed skepticism
relations. A ﬁnal discussion and conclusions are provided in Section 6.
2. Basic concepts
The present work lies in the frame of the general theory of abstract argumentation frameworks proposed by Dung [4].. All rights reserved.
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A, called attack relation.
The idea is that arguments are simply conceived as the elements of the set A, whose origin and structure are not spec-
iﬁed, and the interaction between them is modeled by the binary relation of attack. In the following we will always assume
thatA is ﬁnite. This corresponds to the assumption thatA represents the set of arguments produced by a reasoner at a given
instant of time, which is ﬁnite independently of the fact that the underlying mechanism of argument generation admits the
existence of inﬁnite sets of arguments. Moreover, it has to be remarked that we consider in this paper some recent semantics
proposals whose properties are well characterized in the ﬁnite case while still require investigation in the inﬁnite case [7–9].
Since we will frequently consider properties of sets of arguments, it is useful to extend to them the notations concerning
the attack relation.
Deﬁnition 2. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, an argument a 2A and two sets S; P#A, we deﬁne
S ! a , 9b 2 S : b! a; a! S , 9b 2 S : a! b; S ! P , 9a 2 S; b 2 P : a! b.
Moreover, given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i and a set S#A, we deﬁne outchildAFðSÞ ¼ fa 2
Aja R S ^ S ! ag.
In Dung’s theory, an argumentation semantics S is deﬁned by specifying the criteria for deriving, given a generic argu-
mentation framework, the set of its possible extensions, where an extension E#A is simply a set of arguments considered to
be acceptable together according to S. A basic requirement for any extension E is that it is conﬂict-free, namely
9=a; b 2 E : a! b. All argumentation semantics proposed in the literature satisfy this fundamental conﬂict-free property. Gi-
ven a generic argumentation semantics S, the set of extensions prescribed by S for a given argumentation framework
AF ¼ hA;!i is denoted as ESðAFÞ. Extensions are used to derive the justiﬁcation state of each argument, which stated in ab-
stract terms, is simply a labeling of the arguments using a given set of labelsL, namely a mappingA!L. Alternative ap-
proaches to the notion of justiﬁcation have been considered in the literature (in particular skeptical versus credulous
acceptance), as it will be described in Section 3.
Most semantics are universally deﬁned, namely they admit extensions for any argumentation framework. However it may
be the case that a semantics S is not universally deﬁned, namely there are some argumentation frameworks AF such that
ESðAFÞ ¼ ;. We adopt as a standpoint that such argumentation frameworks lie outside the domain of deﬁnition of S and
therefore have not to be considered in the evaluation of its properties. Formally, for a generic semantics S let DS be the
set of argumentation frameworks where S admits at least one extension, namely DS ¼ fAF : ESðAFÞ – ;g. In the following,
whenever we refer to the comparison of two semantics S1 and S2 with respect to a generic argumentation framework AF
we will implicitly assume that AF 2 DS1 \DS2 . In fact, one1 (or even both) of the terms of comparison would be undeﬁned
otherwise. As a further terminological note, if 8AF 2 DS jESðAFÞj ¼ 1, then the semantics S is said to follow the unique-status
approach, otherwise it is said to follow the multiple-status approach.
3. Skepticism relations
3.1. Basic concepts
According to Webster’s dictionary a skeptical person is one ‘‘not easily persuaded or convinced”. It is a common experi-
ence that very different degrees of ‘‘easiness of persuasion” can be met in everyday reasoning, ranging from credulous to
extremely conservative attitudes: even when sharing the same initial information and possibly even the same reasoning
steps, two people may reach different opinions about some issues, according to their attitude towards skepticism. Then,
modeling and evaluating this kind of attitude turns out to be of interest in the ﬁeld of argumentation, as it aims at capturing
various forms and nuances of practical reasoning in the context of a single general theory.
In fact, the term skepticism has been used in the literature (often in an informal way) to discuss argumentation semantics
behavior, e.g. by observing that a semantics is ‘‘more skeptical” than another one. Intuitively, a semantics is more skeptical
than another if it makes less committed choices about the justiﬁcation of the arguments: a skeptical behavior tends to leave
arguments in an ‘‘undecided” justiﬁcation state, while a non-skeptical behavior corresponds to more ‘‘resolute” choices
about acceptance or rejection of arguments. As a simple paradigmatic example, consider the case where only two equally
credible and conﬂicting arguments a and b have to be evaluated: a skeptical reasoner would regard the state of both a
and b as undecided (neither accepted not rejected), while a non-skeptical (often referred to as credulous in the literature)
reasoner could select either a or b as accepted (and, as a consequence, would treat the other one as rejected). Note, in par-
ticular, that the notion of commitment (or decidedness) of a justiﬁcation state must be clearly distinguished from the notion
of acceptance: two justiﬁcation states corresponding to deﬁnite acceptance and deﬁnite rejection, though reﬂecting antithet-
ical choices about the state of an argument, have both the same highest level of commitment.1 As a matter of fact, in this paper we will consider only one semantics which is not universally deﬁned, namely stable semantics.
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mentation semanticsSwith respect to a given argumentation framework AF is represented by the set ESðAFÞ of extensions2
prescribed by S for AF. The justiﬁcation state of an argument a is then deﬁned as a derived concept, on the basis of the mem-
bership of a to the extensions in ESðAFÞ. For this reason, a comparison of skepticism between semantics can be based on a rela-
tionship between the sets of extensions they prescribe. Since justiﬁcation states are a function of the set of extensions, this kind
of deﬁnition guarantees the highest level of generality: any skepticism relationship based on justiﬁcation states can be ex-
pressed also in terms of extensions, but not vice versa. Following this perspective, one has ﬁrst to introduce a skepticism rela-
tion between sets of extensions and then may consider the skepticism relation between semantics induced by it.
As to the ﬁrst step, we will use the following notation: given two sets of extensions E1; E2 of an argumentation frame-
work AF, E1 E E2 will denote that E1 is at least as skeptical as E2 according to a generic skepticism relation E. As to the
second step, for a given E it is quite natural to deﬁne the induced relation of skepticism S between two semantics S1
and S2, by requiring that E holds for their sets of extensions in any possible case (i.e. for any argumentation framework).
Deﬁnition 3. Let E be a skepticism relation between sets of extensions. The skepticism relation between argumentation
semantics S induced by E is deﬁned as follows: for any argumentation semantics S1 and S2, S1 S S2 if and only if
8AF 2 ðDS1 \DS2 Þ ES1 ðAFÞ E ES2 ðAFÞ.
It is worth noting that, in general, two semantics S1 and S2 may not be comparable with respect to skepticism. For in-
stance, it may be the case that there are two argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 such thatS1 behaves more skeptically
thanS2 in the case of AF1 butS2 behaves more skeptically thanS1 in the case of AF2. Accordingly with this not uncommon
situation,3 useful relations of skepticism (both at the level of sets of extensions and of semantics) are typically partial, rather
than total, orders. Having laid out a basic conceptual framework for skepticism comparison, we are now ready to introduce,
in the next subsection, the speciﬁc relations we will consider.
3.2. A set of skepticism relations
Given two sets of extensions E1; E2 of an argumentation framework AF, comparing them with respect to skepticism may
be considered, at the simplest level, as equivalent to comparing the sets of arguments which are regarded as acceptable on
the basis of E1 and E2, respectively. Clearly, in this view, E1 is more skeptical than E2 if the set of accepted arguments accord-
ing to E1 is included in the set of accepted arguments according to E2. As to the concept of acceptance, two alternative fun-
damental notions are traditionally considered in the literature, namely skeptical acceptance and credulous acceptance, whose
deﬁnition is very simple: an argument is skeptically accepted if it belongs to all extensions while it is credulously accepted if
it belongs to at least an extension. Accordingly, two basic skepticism relations between sets of extensions can be deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 4. Given two sets of extensions E1 and E2 of an argumentation framework AF; E1 E\ E2 iff
T
E12E1E1#
T
E22E2E2.
Deﬁnition 5. Given two sets of extensions E1 and E2 of an argumentation framework AF; E1 E[ E2 iff
S
E12E1E1#
S
E22E2E2.
While Deﬁnitions 4 and 5 differ in the underlying notion of acceptance, they share the same simple comparison method,
based on inclusion of the sets of accepted arguments. From this viewpoint, they correspond to a minimal requirement and
provide an intuitive bound for any relation of skepticism based on either notion of acceptance. In the following, we will
examine some more reﬁned comparison methods and the relevant skepticism relations.
As a ﬁrst step, one may observe that not only accepted arguments, but also the rejected ones should be taken into account
in a similar way. The intuitive idea that an argument is rejected when attacked by an accepted argument directly gives rise to
the following two deﬁnitions, depending on the adopted notion of acceptance.
Deﬁnition 6. Given two sets of extensions E1 and E2 of an argumentation framework AF; E1 E\! E2 if and only if E1 E\ E2
and the following condition holds:2 All
argume
3 Wh
deﬁning\
E12E1
outchildAFðE1Þ#
\
E22E2
outchildAFðE2Þ ð1ÞDeﬁnition 7. Given two sets of extensions E1 and E2 of an argumentation framework AF; E1 E[! E2 if and only if E1 E[ E2
and the following condition holds:[
E12E1
outchildAFðE1Þ#
[
E22E2
outchildAFðE2Þ ð2Þ‘‘traditional” argumentation semantics and the large majority of more recent proposals are extension-based. We do not consider labeling-based
ntation semantics in this paper, but we recall that typically a labeling-based semantics admits an equivalent extension-based formulation [10].
ile we are not concerned with properties of argumentation frameworks in this paper, this observation may raise a question about the possibility of
a skepticism relation for argumentation frameworks. A ﬁrst attempt to address this issue is included in [11].
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As a further step, one may note that the deﬁnitions provided so far operate on the set of extensions ‘‘as a whole” by simply
considering their intersection or union: for instance, very different sets of extensions are treated in the same way if they have
an empty intersection. In order to take account of how individual extensions are deﬁned, a different kind of deﬁnition is
needed. To start, one can note that comparing two individual extensions with respect to skepticism is straightforward: an
extension E1 is more skeptical than an extension E2 if E1# E2. This basic idea has then to be applied over the sets of exten-
sions E1 and E2, according to either the skeptical or the credulous viewpoint. In the former, one is led to require that every
extension in E2 has a more skeptical counterpart in E1. In the latter, one requires dually that every extension in E1 has a less
skeptical counterpart in E2. These notions are formalized by the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 8. Given two sets of extensions E1 and E2 of an argumentation framework AF; E1 E\þ E2 iff 8E2 2
E2 9E1 2 E1 : E1# E2.
Deﬁnition 9. Given two sets of extensions E1 and E2 of an argumentation framework AF; E1 E[þ E2 iff 8E1 2
E1 9E2 2 E2 : E1# E2.
As it will be proved below, E\þ represents a strengthening of E\! , and, similarly, E[þ implies E[! . Finally, one may note
that the two relations taking account of individual extensions can also be combined together, yielding a stronger skepticism
relation unifying the skeptical and credulous perspectives.
Deﬁnition 10. Given two sets of extensions E1 and E2 of an argumentation framework AF; E1 E E2 iff E1 E\þ E2 and
E1 E\þ E2.3.3. Properties of skepticism relations
We have introduced seven alternative skepticism relations between sets of extensions, which, according to Deﬁnition 3,
induce seven corresponding skepticism relations between argumentation semantics. It is now worth analyzing some prop-
erties of the skepticism relations between sets of extensions, which will be ‘‘inherited” by their induced relations.
First, it is easy to see that the relations deﬁned according to either the skeptical or the credulous perspective are in strict
order of implication, with E being the strongest in both cases. In fact, given two sets of extensions E1 and E2 of an argu-
mentation framework AF, it holds that:E1 E E2 ) E1 E\þ E2 ) E1 E\! E2 ) E1 E\ E2 ð3Þ
E1 E E2 ) E1 E[þ E2 ) E1 E[! E2 ) E1 E[ E2 ð4ÞThe only nontrivial implications in (3) and (4) are proved in Propositions 11 and 12.
Proposition 11. Given two sets of extensions E1 and E2 of an argumentation framework AF; E1 E\þ E2 ) E1 E\! E2.
Proof. We have to show that
T
E12E1E1#
T
E22E2E2 and
T
E12E1outchildAFðE1Þ#
T
E22E2outchildAFðE2Þ. As to the former inclusion
relation, consider a generic argument a 2 TE12E1E1. Since E1 E\þ E2 we know that 8E2 2 E2 9E1 2 E1 : E1# E2, but then, since
a belongs to any E1, we have also that a belongs to any E2, hence a 2
T
E22E2E2. As to the latter, consider a generic argument
a 2 TE12E1outchildAFðE1Þ, namely 8E1 2 E1 E1 ! a. Again, since we know that 8E2 2 E2 9E1 2 E1 : E1# E2 it follows that8E2 2 E2 E2 ! a, hence a 2 TE22E2outchildAFðE2Þ. h
Proposition 12. Given two sets of extensions E1 and E2 of an argumentation framework AF; E1 E[þ E2 ) E1 E[! E2.
Proof. We have to show that
S
E12E1E1#
S
E22E2E2 and
S
E12E1outchildAFðE1Þ#
S
E22E2outchildAFðE2Þ. As to the former inclusion
relation, consider a generic argument a 2 SE12E1E1. Since E1 E[þ E2 we know that 8E1 2 E1 9E2 2 E2 : E1# E2 but then
9E2 2 E2 : a 2 E2, hence a 2
S
E22E2E2. As to the latter, consider a generic argument a 2
S
E12E1outchildAFðE1Þ, namely
9E1 2 E1 : E1 ! a. Again, since we know that 8E1 2 E1 9E2 2 E2 : E1# E2, it follows that 9E2 2 E2 : E2 ! a, hence
a 2 SE22E2outchildAFðE2Þ. h
As already mentioned, skepticism relations are not (and, in general, should not be) total orders. It is however reason-
able to require that they are preorders, namely that they satisfy the reﬂexive and transitive property. In fact, a semantics
(set of extensions) is obviously at least as skeptical as itself. Moreover if a semantics (set of extensions) S1 is at least as
skeptical as another semantics S2, and S2 is at least as skeptical as S3, it would be, in our opinion, counterintuitive if S1
was not at least as skeptical as S3. All the considered skepticism relations are preorders, as shown by the following
proposition.
Proposition 13. The relations E\, E[, E\! , E[! , E\þ , E[þ , E are preorders, i.e. they are reﬂexive and transitive.
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E 2 fE\;E[;E\! ;E[! ;E\þ ;E[þ ;Eg and for any set of extensions E, EEE. Let us now consider transitive property. In
the case of E\, E[, E\! and E[! it follows directly from the transitivity of set inclusion. As for transitivity of E\þ , let us sup-
pose that E1 E\þ E2 and E2 E\þ E3. From the latter relation, we have that 8E3 2 E3 9E2 2 E2 : E2# E3, which, taking into
account that E1 E\þ E2 entails that 9E1 2 E1 such that E1# E2# E3. Therefore, E1 E\þ E3. Similarly, for transitivity of E[þ
let us suppose that E1 E[þ E2 and E2 E[þ E3. From the former relation, we have 8E1 2 E1 9E2 2 E2 : E1# E2, while from the
latter we have 8E2 2 E2 9E3 2 E3 : E2# E3. Then 8E1 2 E1 9E3 2 E3 : E1# E3, namely E1 E[þ E3. Finally, transitivity of E fol-
lows directly from its deﬁnition as the conjunction of E\þ and E[þ (which, as shown above, satisfy the transitive
property). h
As a ﬁnal remark, we may focus on the special case of comparison between two unique-status semantics S1 and S2,
which, in terms of sets of extensions, corresponds to comparing two singletons E1 ¼ fE1g and E2 ¼ fE2g. In this situation
any reasonable skepticism relation E should be equivalent to the inclusion relation E1# E2, which also entails that E is
antisymmetric in this case (namely E1 E E2 and E2 E E1 implies E1 ¼ E2). Happily, all the introduced relations satisfy this
special requirement, as stated in the following proposition whose trivial proof is omitted.
Proposition 14. Let E1 ¼ fE1g and E2 ¼ fE2g be singleton sets of extensions. For any E 2 fE\;E[;E\! ;E[! ;E\þ ;E[þ ;Eg,
E1 E E2 iff E1# E2.4. A review of extension-based argumentation semantics
We review the deﬁnition of several argumentation semantics which will be compared according to the skepticism rela-
tions deﬁned in previous section.
4.1. Traditional semantics
Stable semantics relies on the idea that an extension should be able to reject the arguments that are outside the extension
itself [4].
Deﬁnition 15. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, a set E#A is a stable extension of AF if and only if E is
conﬂict-free ^8a 2A : a R E; E ! a.
Stable semantics will be denoted as ST, and, accordingly, the set of all the stable extensions of (AF) as ESTðAFÞ. Stable
semantics is not universally deﬁned, namely there are argumentation frameworks where no extensions complying with Def-
inition 15 exist. No other semantics considered in this paper is affected by this problem. For this reason, a separate additional
analysis concerning skepticism relations in the context of argumentation frameworks where stable extensions exist will be
necessary.
The requirement that an extension should attack all other external arguments can be relaxed by imposing that an exten-
sion is simply able to defend itself from external attacks. This is at the basis of the notions of acceptable argument and admis-
sible set [4].
Deﬁnition 16. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, an argument a 2A is acceptablewith respect to a set E#A
if and only if 8b 2A : b! a; E! b. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, a set E#A is admissible if and only if E
is conﬂict-free and 8b 2A : b! E; E! b.
The set of the arguments acceptable with respect to a set E is traditionally denoted using the characteristic function FAFðEÞ.
Deﬁnition 17. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, the function FAF : 2A ! 2A which, given a set E#A,
returns the set of the acceptable arguments with respect to E, is called the characteristic function of AF.
Building on these concepts, the notion of complete extension can be introduced, which plays a key role in Dung’s theory,
since all semantics encompassed by his framework select their extensions among the complete ones.
Deﬁnition 18. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, a set E#A is a complete extension if and only if E is
admissible and every argument of A which is acceptable with respect to E belongs to E.
The notion of complete extension is not associated to a notion of complete semantics in [4], however, the term ‘‘complete
semantics” has subsequently gained acceptance in the literature [12] to refer to the properties of the set of complete exten-
sions. Complete semantics will be denoted as CO.
The well-known grounded semantics, denoted as GR, belongs to the unique-status approach and its unique extension, de-
noted as GE(AF), can be deﬁned as the least ﬁxed point of the characteristic function.
Deﬁnition 19. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, the grounded extension of AF, denoted as GE(AF), is the least
ﬁxed point (with respect to set inclusion) of FAF.
Preferred semantics, denoted as PR, is obtained by simply requiring the property of maximality along with admissibility.
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maximal (with respect to set inclusion) admissible set.4.2. CF2 semantics
CF2 semantics, introduced in [13], is a SCC-recursive semantics [8] which features the distinctive property of treating in a
‘‘symmetric” way odd- and even-length cycles while belonging to the multiple-status approach. SCC-recursiveness is related
to the graph-theoretical notion of strongly connected components of an argumentation framework AF, namely the equivalence
classes of arguments under the relation of mutual reachability via attack links, denoted as SCCSAF. To exemplify this notion
we provide SCCSAF for some argumentation frameworks to be used later. In Fig. 4 we have SCCSAF ¼ ffag; fbg; fcg; fdg; fgg;
in Fig. 5: SCCSAF ¼ ffa; b; c; dgg; in Fig. 6: SCCSAF ¼ ffa; bg; fcg; fdgg; in Fig. 7: SCCSAF ¼ ffa1;a2g; fb1; b2; b3g; fcg; fdgg; in
Fig. 8: SCCSAF ¼ ffa; b; cg; fdg; fgg; in Fig. 9: SCCSAF ¼ ffa; b; c; d; g; ff;ggg.
CF2 semantics can be roughly regarded as selecting its extensions among the maximal conﬂict-free sets of AF, on the basis
of some topological requirements related to the decomposition of AF into strongly connected components. In particular it
turns out that when AF consists of exactly one strongly connected component, the set of extensions prescribed by CF2
semantics exactly coincides with the set of maximal conﬂict-free sets of AF. Due to space limitations, we cannot examine
in detail the deﬁnition of CF2 semantics: the interested reader may refer to [13,8].
Deﬁnition 21. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, a set E#A is an extension of CF2 semantics iff
 E 2MCFAF if jSCCSAFj ¼ 1.
 8S 2 SCCSAF ðE \ SÞ 2 ECF2ðAF#UPAFðS;EÞÞ otherwise.
whereMCFAF denotes the set of maximal conﬂict-free sets of AF, and, for any set S#A, AF#S denotes the restriction of AF to
S, namely AF#S ¼ hS;! \ðS SÞi, and UPAFðS; EÞ ¼ fa 2 Sj 9=b 2 E : b R S; b! ag.4.3. Semi-stable semantics
Semi-stable semantics [7], denoted asSST, aims at guaranteeing the existence of extensions in any case (differently from
stable semantics) while coinciding with stable semantics (differently from preferred semantics) when stable extensions ex-
ist. The deﬁnition of extensions satisfying these desiderata is ingeniously simple.
Deﬁnition 22. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, a set E#A is a semi-stable extension if and only if E is a
complete extension such that ðE [ fajE ! agÞ is maximal with respect to set inclusion.4.4. Ideal semantics
Ideal semantics [14] provides an alternative unique-status approach which is less skeptical than grounded semantics, i.e.
for any argumentation framework the (unique) ideal extension is a (sometimes strict) superset of the grounded extension.
Also in this case the deﬁnition is quite simple.
Deﬁnition 23. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, a set E#A is ideal if and only if E is admissible and
8P 2 EPRðAFÞ E# P. The ideal extension is the maximal (with respect to set inclusion) ideal set.
We will use the symbol ID to refer to the ideal semantics, and denote the ideal extension of an argumentation frame-
work AF as IDðAFÞ.
4.5. Prudent semantics
Prudent semantics [9,15] emphasizes the role of indirect attacks: forbidding them leads to the deﬁnition of p(rudent)-
admissible sets.
Deﬁnition 24. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, an argument a indirectly attacks another argument b,
denoted as a,!b, if there is an odd-length path from a to b in the defeat graph corresponding to AF. A set S is without indirect
conﬂicts, denoted as icf ðSÞ, if and only if 9=a; b 2 S : a,!b.
Deﬁnition 25. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, a set of arguments S#A is p(rudent)-admissible if and
only if 8a 2 S a is acceptable with respect to S and icf ðSÞ.
On this basis, the prudent version of several traditional notions of extensions (and then of the relevant semantics) has
been deﬁned: we will consider here only those which give rise to universally deﬁned semantics.
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 a preferred p-extension if and only if S is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) p-admissible set;
 a complete p-extension if and only if S is p-admissible and there is no argument a R S such that a is acceptable with respect
to S and icf ðS [ fagÞ.
Deﬁnition 27. Given an argumentation framework AF ¼ hA;!i, the function FpAF : 2A ! 2A such that for a given set S#A,
FpAFðSÞ ¼ faja is acceptable with respect to S ^ icf ðS [ fagÞg is called the p-characteristic function of AF. Let j be the lowest inte-
ger such that the sequence Fp;iAFð;Þ is stationary for iP j : Fp;jAFð;Þ is the grounded p-extension of AF, denoted as GPE(AF).
The prudent versions of grounded, complete and preferred semantics will be denoted as GRP, COP and PRP,
respectively.
4.6. Set-theoretical relationships between extensions
Set-theoretical relationships between extensions of different semantics have been analyzed extensively in the literature.
We recall in Proposition 28 several results to be used in the sequel (a literature reference is provided for each statement).
Proposition 28. For any argumentation framework AF the following relationships between extensions of semantics introduced in
Sections 4.1–4.5
(a) [4] GEðAFÞ 2 ECOðAFÞ;
(b) [4] 8E 2 ECOðAFÞ GEðAFÞ# E;
(c) [4] EPRðAFÞ#ECOðAFÞ;
(d) [4] 8E1 2 ECOðAFÞ 9E2 2 EPRðAFÞ : E1# E2;
(e) [13] 8E 2 ECF2ðAFÞ GEðAFÞ# E;
(f) [13] 8E1 2 EPRðAFÞ 9E2 2 ECF2ðAFÞ : E1# E2;
(g) [7] ESSTðAFÞ#EPRðAFÞ;
(h) [14] GEðAFÞ# IDðAFÞ;
(i) [9] GPEðAFÞ 2 ECOPðAFÞ;
(j) [9] EPRPðAFÞ#ECOPðAFÞ;
(k) [9] 8E1 2 ECOPðAFÞ 9E2 2 EPRPðAFÞ : E1# E2;
(l) [9] 8E1 2 EPRPðAFÞ 9E2 2 EPRðAFÞ : E1# E2.5. Skepticism comparison of argumentation semantics
In this section we carry out a systematic comparison of the semantics reviewed in Section 4 according to the seven rela-
tions introduced in Section 3: we will provide the Hasse diagram for each relation S and prove accordingly whether S
holds or not for each pair of semantics. After examining the general case of universally deﬁned semantics, the more restricted
class DST of argumentation frameworks where stable extensions exist will also be considered. Before entering the matter, a
result which will be used in the following needs to be stated.
Lemma 29. Given two argumentation semantics S1 and S2, if for any argumentation framework AF ES1 ðAFÞ#ES2 ðAFÞ, then
S2 S\þ S1 and S1 S[þ S2.
Proof. Both statements immediately follow from the fact that 8E1 2 ES1 ðAFÞ 9E2 2 ES2 ðAFÞ : E1 ¼ E2. h5.1. The general case
To begin our comparison, we examine S whose Hasse diagram is shown in Fig. 1. Starting from the bottom, let us show
that GRP S GR, which, both belonging to the unique-status approach, is equivalent to the inclusion relation proved in
Proposition 30.
Proposition 30. For any argumentation framework AF, GPEðAFÞ#GEðAFÞ.
Proof. Recall from [4] that GEðAFÞ ¼ SiP1FiAFð;Þ and GPEðAFÞ ¼ Fp;jAFð;Þ, where j is the lowest integer such that the sequence
Fp;iAFð;Þ is stationary for iP j. Now, obviously F1AFð;Þ ¼ Fp;1AF ð;Þ (since both coincide with the set of unattacked arguments in AF).
Assume inductively that Fp;iAFð;Þ# FiAFð;Þ, then it holds that Fp;iþ1AF ð;Þ# Fiþ1AF ð;Þ. In fact, any a 2 Fp;iþ1AF ð;Þ is acceptable w.r.t. Fp;iAFð;Þ,
but then it is also acceptable w.r.t. FiAFð;Þ  Fp;iAFð;Þ, and therefore a 2 Fiþ1AF ð;Þ. h
Fig. 1. S relation for any argumentation framework.
P. Baroni, M. Giacomin / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 854–866 861Going up in the diagram, we have that GR S CO by Proposition 28b. Furthermore, it is easy to see that
CO S PR : CO S\þ PR follows from Proposition 28c and Lemma 29, while CO S[þ PR follows from Proposition 28d. As
to the upper-left part of the diagram, Proposition 28h entails that GR S ID. Moreover, by deﬁnition, the ideal extension
is included in any preferred extension: it follows that ID S PR and, by Proposition 28g, also that ID S SST. As to
CF2 semantics, Proposition 28e and a entail that CO S\þ CF2, while from Proposition 28f and d we have CO S[þ CF2: sum-
ming up, CO S CF2. Turning to the right bottom part, it is easy to see that COP S CO. COP S\þ CO follows from the fact
that GPEðAFÞ 2 ECOPðAFÞ (Proposition 28i) and 8E2 2 ECOðAFÞ GPEðAFÞ#GEðAFÞ# E2 (using Proposition 30 for the ﬁrst inclu-
sion and Proposition 28b for the second one). Moreover, COP S[þ CO, i.e. 8E1 2 ECOPðAFÞ 9E2 2 ECOðAFÞ : E1# E2, can be de-
rived by applying Proposition 28k, l and c. Turning ﬁnally to preferred prudent semantics, COP S\þ PRP follows from
Proposition 28j and Lemma 29, while COPS[þPRP follows from Proposition 28k, yielding COP S PRP.
Let us consider now the skepticism relations S\þ , S\! and S\, which turn out to coincide for the considered semantics
and whose Hasse diagram is shown in Fig. 2: we will comment only on edges not implied by those already examined in
Fig. 1, and we will focus on S\þ which implies also S\! and S\. Starting from the bottom, since GPEðAFÞ 2 ECOPðAFÞ (Prop-
osition 28i), Lemma 29 directly entails that COP S\þ GRP. The next difference with respect to S concerns grounded and
complete semantics. We already know that GR S\þ CO, we now note, by Lemma 29, that CO S\þ GR, since GEðAFÞ 2 ECOðAFÞ
(Proposition 28a). Finally, again by Lemma 29, we have PR S\þ SST on the basis of Proposition 28g.
Also the skepticism relationsS[þ , S[! and S[ turn out to coincide for the considered semantics: they are described by the
Hasse diagram of Fig. 3. The edges that are not directly entailed by S can all be derived on the basis of Lemma 29: in par-
ticular, from Proposition 28i, j, g and c it follows that GRP S[þ COP, PRP S[þ COP,SST S[þ PR and PR S[þ CO, respec-
tively (obviously, the same relationships hold for S[! and S[).
While we have now proved the existence of all the edges shown in Figs. 1–3, one might wonder whether additional rela-
tionships hold. We prove that this is not the case, starting from the relations S\þ , S\! and S\: due to the order of implication
between them, it is sufﬁcient to prove that no additional relationships hold for S\. First, considering Fig. 4, we have
ECOPðAFÞ ¼ ffd; g; fa; gg (note in particular that a indirectly conﬂicts with d), while GPEðAFÞ ¼ ffd; gg, which entails
GRP  S\ COP. Since it also holds that GEðAFÞ ¼ fd; ;ag, it is easy to see that GEðAFÞGPEðAFÞ, i.e. GR  S\ GRP. Going
up in the diagram, the example of Fig. 5 shows that ID  S\ GR, since IDðAFÞ ¼ fb; dg while GEðAFÞ ¼ ;. The well-known
example of Fig. 6, concerning so-called ﬂoating arguments, shows that PR  S\ ID, since EPRðAFÞ ¼ ffa; dg; fb; dgg while
IDðAFÞ ¼ ;. The fact that SST  S\ PR can be deduced by considering Fig. 7, where ESSTðAFÞ ¼ fa2; b2; dg while
EPRðAFÞ ¼ ffa1g; fa2; b2; dgg and therefore
T
E2EPRðAFÞE ¼ ;.
Turning to the relationships of CF2 semantics with other semantics (except PRP) by transitivity of S\ it is sufﬁcient to
show: (i) ID  S\ CF2 and (ii) CF2 
S
\ SST. As to condition (i), referring to Fig. 5 it holds that IDðAFÞ ¼ fb; dg, whileFig. 2. S\þ , S\! and S\ relations for any argumentation framework.
Fig. 3. S[þ , S[! and S[ relations for any argumentation framework.
Fig. 4. A case showing that GRP  S\ COP, GR 
S
\ GRP, GRP 
S
\ PRP and GR 
S
[ GRP.
Fig. 5. A case showing that ID  S\ GR, ID 
S
\ CF2, ID 
S
[ GR and CF2 
S
[ PR.
Fig. 6. A case showing that PR  S\ ID.
Fig. 7. A case showing that SST  S\ PR, PR 
S
[ SST, COP 
S
[ SST (and CF2 
S
\ PR in the context of DST).
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P. Baroni, M. Giacomin / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 854–866 863ECF2ðAFÞ ¼ ffc; dg; fb; dg; fagg. As a consequence of transitivity, lettingS be any semantics in fID;PR;SSTg, it holds that
S  S\ CF2. As to condition (ii), in the example of Fig. 8 it holds that ECF2ðAFÞ ¼ ffa; g; fb; g; fc; gg, thus
T
E2ECF2ðAFÞE ¼ fg,
while ESSTðAFÞ ¼ f;g. By transitivity, condition (ii) implies CF2  S\ S for S 2 fCOP;GRP;GR;CO;ID;PR;SSTg.
Considering now preferred prudent semantics, by transitivity of S\ it is sufﬁcient to show: (i) GRP  S\ PRP, (ii)
PRP  S\ SST and (iii) PRP 
S
\ CF2. As to condition (i), in the example of Fig. 4 we have that GPEðAFÞ ¼ fd; g while
EPRPðAFÞ ¼ ffd; g; fa; gg. As a consequence, letting S be any of the semantics shown in Fig. 2 (except COP), it holds that
S  S\ PRP. As to conditions (ii) and (iii), in the example of Fig. 9 taken from [15] it holds that EPRPðAFÞ ¼ ffggg, while
ESSTðAFÞ ¼ ffa; c;gg; fb; d; fg; fb; d;ggg and ECF2ðAFÞ ¼ ffa; c;gg; fb; d; fg; fb; d;gg; f; b;gg; f; b; fgg. By transitivity, condi-
tion (ii) implies PRP  S\ S for S 2 fCOP;GRP;GR;CO;ID;PR;SSTg.
Turning to non-existence of edges in Fig. 3, similarly to the previous case it is sufﬁcient to consider the relation S[ only.
Starting from the bottom, the example of Fig. 4 shows that GR  S[ GRP, since GEðAFÞ ¼ fd; ;ag while GPEðAFÞ ¼ fd; g.
From the example of Fig. 5 we have ID  S[ GR, since in this case IDðAFÞ ¼ fb; dg while GEðAFÞ ¼ ;. Going up in the diagram,
the example of Fig. 10 entailsSST  S[ ID, since ESSTðAFÞ ¼ ffag; fbgg, thus
S
E2ESSTðAFÞE ¼ fa; bg, while IDðAFÞ ¼ ;. More-
over, as already mentioned, in Fig. 7 it holds that EPRðAFÞ ¼ ffa1g; fa2; b2; dgg and ESSTðAFÞ ¼ fa2; b2; dg, thusPR  S[ SST.
Finally, CF2  S[ PR since, in Fig. 5, ECF2ðAFÞ ¼ ffc; dg; fb; dg; fagg while EPRðAFÞ ¼ ffb; dgg. Turning to complete prudent and
preferred prudent semantics, by transitivity of S[ it is sufﬁcient to show: (i) GR  S[ PRP and (ii) COP  S[ SST. Condition
(i) follows, for instance, from the example of Fig. 11 where GEðAFÞ ¼ fa; ;/g while EPRPðAFÞ ¼ ffa; gg (note in particular
that a and  indirectly conﬂict with /). By transitivity, condition (i) entails that S1  S[ S2 for S1 2 fGR;ID;
SST;PR;CO;CF2g andS2 2 fCOP;PRPg. As to condition (ii), in the example of Fig. 7 it turns out that fa1g is a complete
prudent extension while ESSTðAFÞ ¼ fa2; b2; dg, thus it cannot be the case that
S
E2ECOPðAFÞE#
S
E2ESSTðAFÞE. Again by transitiv-
ity, condition (ii) entails S1  S[ S2 for S1 2 fCOP;PRPg and S2 2 fGRP;GR;ID;SSTg.Fig. 8. A case showing that CF2  S\ SST.
Fig. 10. A case showing that SST  S[ ID.
Fig. 11. A case showing that GR  S[ PRP.
Fig. 9. A case showing that PRP  S\ SST and PRP 
S
\ CF2.
Fig. 12. Hasse diagrams for argumentation frameworks where stable extensions exist.
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S1  S\ S2 _S1  S[ S2 )S1  S S2. For instance, according to the Hasse diagram in Fig. 2 CF2  S\ PRP and PRP  S\ CF2,
entailing that CF2 and preferred prudent semantics are not comparable also according to S. Non-existence of the other
edges can be proved in a similar way.
5.2. The case where stable extensions exist
Having completed the analysis concerning universally deﬁned argumentation semantics, we now consider the class DST
of argumentation frameworks where stable extensions exist. Obviously, all the relationships holding in the general case also
hold in this restricted set of argumentation frameworks. On the other hand, it may be the case that a given relationship S
not holding in general actually holds in the context of DST, since all argumentation frameworks such that S does not hold
are outside DST. Actually, as shown in the Hasse diagrams of Fig. 12 it turns out that there are only two differences with
respect to the general case. The ﬁrst difference is (of course) the presence of stable semantics, which, as shown in [7], coin-
cides with semi-stable semantics in the context of DST. The second difference is the additional relationship CF2 S\þ SST
(or, equivalently, CF2 S\þ ST) proved in Proposition 31.
Proposition 31. For any argumentation framework AF 2 DST, it holds that 8E2 2 ESTðAFÞ 9E1 2 ECF2ðAFÞ : E1# E2.
Proof. We prove that for any AF 2 DST ESTðAFÞ#ECF2ðAFÞ, which directly entails the conclusion. First, any stable extension
is a preferred extension [4], thus by Proposition 28f we have that 8AF 2 DST; 8E1 2 ESTðAFÞ 9E2 2 ECF2ðAFÞ : E1# E2. Since
any stable extension is, by deﬁnition, a maximal conﬂict-free set of AF and since any CF2-extension is conﬂict-free, it must be
the case that E1 ¼ E2. h
Turning to non-existence of additional edges in the diagrams of Fig. 12, let us ﬁrst consider S\þ , S\! and S\ relations. It
can be seen that a stable extension exists in all of the argumentation frameworks exploited in Section 5.1 to prove that no
additional relationships hold for S\, with the exception of the example of Fig. 8, which was exploited to show that in general
CF2  S\þ SST, while CF2 S\þ SST actually holds in the context of DST. Thus, taking again into account the transitive
property of S\ it remains to be proved that CF2  S\ PR in the context of DST. This can be shown, for instance, by the exam-
ple of Fig. 7 where ECF2ðAFÞ ¼ ffa1; b1; dg; fa1; b2; dg; fa1; b3; dg; fa2; b2; dgg, thus
T
E2ECF2ðAFÞE ¼ fdg, while EPRðAFÞ ¼ ffa1g;
fa2; b2; dgg and therefore
T
E2EPRðAFÞE ¼ ;.
As for the Hasse diagram of relations S[þ , S[! and S[, all examples of argumentation frameworks exploited in Section 5.1
admit stable extensions, directly entailing non-existence of additional relationships. Finally, from the results obtained for the
diagrams of S\þ and S[þ relations it is again easy to prove that no additional edges exist in the diagram of S, taking into
account that S1  S\ S2 _S1  S[ S2 )S1  S S2.
6. Conclusions
We have introduced in a principled way a set of skepticism relations for the comparison of argumentation semantics.
Building on simple intuitive ideas, we have identiﬁed three relations (ordered by implication) corresponding to the notion
of skeptical acceptance and three dual relations (also ordered by implication) corresponding to the notion of credulous
acceptance. Finally, a stronger relation, which implies all others and, in a sense, covers both skeptical and credulous
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tation semantics in the literature: as to our knowledge, only the simplest relations S\ and S[ have been previously consid-
ered (e.g. in [9] where they are called cautiousness relations). In some previous papers of ours [16–18], only S\, S\þ and S
were considered, the duality between the credulous and the skeptical perspective was not examined and the ‘‘unifying” role
of S was not identiﬁed.
From a more general viewpoint, the consideration of skepticism-related notions in the literature predates the develop-
ment of abstract argumentation theory. Skeptical and credulous reasoning were confronted in the context of inheritance net-
works in [19] where, at an informal level, it is stated that a ‘‘skeptical reasoner refuses to draw conclusions in ambiguous
situations”, while ‘‘credulous reasoners try to conclude as much as possible”. This intuitive notion was then formalized by
distinguishing ‘‘skeptical inheritance”, which gives rise to a unique set of conclusions in any case, and ‘‘credulous inheri-
tance”, which produces alternative sets of conclusions. In our context this corresponds to the unique vs. multiple-status
alternative, which, as pointed out in [6], is actually ‘‘independent of the distinction skeptical vs. credulous reasoning” in
the context of argumentation semantics. Relationships between inheritance networks and argumentation systems have been
the subject of further work [20,21], dealing in particular with representation and meaning of the notion of speciﬁcity. It has
to be remarked however that the speciﬁcity relations addressed in these papers hold between defaults and/or between argu-
ments, typically in contexts where a given semantics is adopted. On the other hand, the skepticism relations we consider in
this paper hold between semantics, independently of the knowledge and facts characterizing speciﬁc reasoning problems.
Some kinds of skepticism relations have also been investigated in the context of logic programming with negation as failure.
On one hand, alternative notions of equivalence between logic programs have been proposed, including strong equivalence
[22] and uniform equivalence [23]. These works can be regarded as complementary to ours: in fact they do not concern rela-
tionships between semantics (actually they take for granted the adoption of stable semantics for logic programs) but rather
between programs. As such, they lie at a less abstract representation level with respect to the framework we consider. In fact,
given that mappings between logic programs with negation as failure and argumentation frameworks have been proposed in
the literature (see e.g. [4]) an interesting direction of future investigation may concern drawing links between these works
and the issue of deﬁning skepticism and equivalence relationships between argumentation frameworks, mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.1. On the other hand, relationships between logic programming semantics are somehow closer to the present work:
equivalence between some logic programming semantics has been investigated in [24], while relationships between alter-
native notion of justiﬁcations (in turn based on alternative notions of attack and defence in the context of logic programs)
have been identiﬁed in [25]. Drawing links between these results and those presented, at a more abstract level, in this paper
is a matter of further investigation, to be carried out on the basis of correspondences between argumentation semantics and
logic programming semantics. In this respect, it has to be noted that the above mentioned papers deal with logic program-
ming semantics that can be put in correspondence with ‘‘traditional” argumentation semantics only.
Focusing on the context of abstract argumentation, we have exploited the proposed relations to provide a comprehensive
skepticism comparison, concerning a signiﬁcant range of both ‘‘traditional” and more recent universally deﬁned argumenta-
tion semantics. It turns out that only three distinct partial orders are induced, one corresponding to the skeptical perspective
(relations S\, S\! and S\þ ), one to the credulous perspective (relations S[, S[! and S[þ ) and one to the stronger relation S.
The same happens when considering also the most signiﬁcant literature semantics which is not universally deﬁned, namely
stable semantics: we have shown that only minor differences arise in this case.
Commenting on the resulting Hasse diagrams, both the skeptical and the credulous perspectives give rise to an almost
linear ordering not including just CF2 and PRP in the former case, and PRP and COP in the latter. In the context of skep-
tical acceptance, semantics related to the notion of stable extension, namely semi-stable (and stable, when deﬁned) turn out
to be the least skeptical, while the notions of grounded and complete extension (more so their prudent counterpart) provide
a bottom reference for skepticism. Ideal and preferred semantics lie orderly between grounded and stable-related semantics
and can be regarded as ‘‘intermediate”. So does CF2 semantics, while being not comparable with ideal, preferred and (in the
general case) also with semi-stable semantics. It is also interesting to note that prudent versions of grounded and complete
semantics tend to make ‘‘more extreme” the skepticism properties of their traditional counterparts, while PRP shows a sort
of singularity being comparable only with COP. In the context of credulous acceptance some relationships turn out to hold in
the opposite sense (as evident also from the statement of Lemma 29). In particular unique-status semantics ðGRP;GR;IDÞ
turn out to be the most skeptical (as intuitive in a context where the union of extensions is considered), while preferred,
complete, and (more so) CF2 are the least skeptical. Semi-stable semantics can be regarded as intermediate, as well as
COP and PRP, which however are not comparable with GR, ID and SST. The strong relation S gives rise to a more
complicated situation, where grounded prudent and complete prudent semantics are the most skeptical in some sense
(but are incomparable each other). At the ‘‘top level”, stable-related, preferred and CF2 semantics are not comparable and
turn out to be less skeptical than any other semantics they are comparable with. Ideal and complete semantics play a sort
of intermediate role between grounded and other less skeptical semantics, while preferred prudent semantics is somehow
isolated.
While all the above remarks are interesting in some respect, one may be led to conclude that S is actually too demand-
ing (as also observed when applying it to a different kind of analysis in [17]), while the weaker relations coherent with skep-
tical or credulous perspective are more reasonable and give rise to a more useful picture. Finally, it has to be remarked that
skepticism can be regarded as an attitude rather than an evaluation criterion for semantics: a more (or less) skeptical seman-
tics is not preferable per se. In fact, characterizing the appropriate level of skepticism with respect to the requirements of a
866 P. Baroni, M. Giacomin / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 854–866speciﬁc reasoning context is an interesting open problem: an example of this kind of investigation, concerning epistemic vs.
practical reasoning, is given in [26].
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